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The General Dispute Settlement System of the UN Convention on the Law of the 








This paper is designed to provide an introduction to the papers of this symposium that 
follow by giving an overview of the dispute settlement provisions of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, placing them in the context of dispute settlement 
in international law generally, and explaining the extent to which they have been used 
so far.  
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The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)1 contains three distinct, albeit 
inter-related, systems of dispute settlement. These systems govern the following types 
of dispute: 
1. Disputes between States parties relating to the interpretation and 
application of the LOSC, other than disputes falling in categories 2 and 3 
below. The system for settling such disputes, referred to hereafter as the 
general dispute settlement system of the LOSC, is set out in Part XV of the 
LOSC.  
2. Disputes relating to the mining of minerals in the International Seabed 
Area (the Area). Unlike the general dispute settlement system, the system 
for settling disputes relating to mining in the Area is applicable not only to 
disputes concerning the LOSC but also to disputes over the interpretation 
and application of various other instruments, such as the regulations and 
contracts made by the International Seabed Authority (the Authority). 
Furthermore, potential parties to such disputes include not just States 
parties but a range of non-State actors, including the Authority, the 
Enterprise (the Authority’s mining arm), State enterprises, and natural and 
legal persons. Furthermore, whereas the general system of dispute 
settlement gives the disputants a considerable choice of forum for settling 
a dispute (as will be seen), disputes relating to mining in the Area are, 
subject to some limited qualifications, dealt with exclusively by a single 
body, the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber. The system for settling disputes 
relating to mining in the Area is set out in section 5 of Part XI, rather than 
Part XV.  
                                                 
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 
November 1994) 1833 UNTS 396. 
2
3. Disputes between a flag State, exercising diplomatic protection on behalf 
of a natural or legal person owning a ship having its nationality, and a 
State that has detained such a ship for alleged illegal fishing in its EEZ or 
for a pollution offence, where the dispute concerns the alleged failure by 
the detaining State promptly to release the vessel on payment of a bond or 
other security. The procedure for dealing with such disputes is set out in 
Article 292 of the LOSC.   
This paper will not deal with the last two systems of dispute settlement. The 
second has yet to be used. This is probably because to date there has been no 
commercial mining in the Area and because the decision-making processes of the 
Authority are designed to minimise the chances of a dispute arising.2 The specialized 
prompt release procedures of Article 292 are not discussed in this paper because they 
are the subject of a separate paper in this Symposium. In discussing the LOSC’s 
general dispute settlement system, I will begin with a brief overview of the relevant 
provisions of the LOSC, explaining the reasons for their inclusion in the LOSC and 
placing them in the context of dispute settlement in international law generally. This 
will be followed by an analysis of the use so far made of judicial settlement under Part 
XV.  
    
 
Background, overview and context 
 
At the first attempt made by the United Nations (UN) to codify the law of the sea, the 
First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea held in 1958, no provisions on dispute 
                                                 
2 While there have been no disputes referred for settlement, the Chamber has delivered one advisory 
opinion, Responsibilities and Obligations of States with respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory 
Opinion of 1 February 2011, ITLOS Reports 2011, 10. 
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settlement were included in any of the four conventions adopted at that Conference, 
with the limited exception of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the 
Living Resources of the High Seas,3 which provided for certain kinds of disputes 
concerning its provisions to be submitted by any party to the dispute to a special 
commission for binding decision.4 Instead, the Conference adopted an optional 
protocol providing that any dispute relating to the interpretation or application of any 
of the four Conventions could be referred by any party to the dispute to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), unless the parties agreed to arbitration instead. In 
addition, the parties could also agree to conciliation; and if one of the parties did not 
accept the recommendation of the conciliation commission, the other party could refer 
the matter to the ICJ.5 The Optional Protocol was not widely accepted: of the 70 or so 
States parties to one or more of the Geneva Conventions, only 28 accepted the 
Protocol. In addition, a further nine States signed the Protocol but did not ratify any of 
the Conventions. In practice, no party to a dispute concerning the Geneva 
Conventions ever invoked the Protocol’s provisions. The approach to dispute 
settlement at the First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea set a pattern that was 
followed at other UN law-making conferences during this period. Thus, the Vienna 
Conventions on Diplomatic Relations and on Consular Relations, adopted in 1961 and 
1963 respectively, each have attached to them an optional protocol on dispute 
settlement containing very similar provisions to the Geneva law of the sea Optional 
Protocol.6    
                                                 
3 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (adopted 29 April 
1958, entered into force 20 March 1966) 559 UNTS 285. 
4 Arts 9-12 of the Convention. These provisions were never invoked, probably because the Convention 
was never ratified by the major fishing States and therefore remained largely a dead letter. 
5 Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes arising from the 
Law of the Sea Conventions (adopted 29 April 1958, entered into force 30 September 1962) 450 UNTS 
170. 
6 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning the Compulsory 
Settlement of Disputes (adopted 18 April 1961, entered into force 24 April 1964) 500 UNTS 241; and 
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 By the time of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973-82), 
attitudes to dispute settlement had moved on from those of the late 1950s and early 
1960s. It was beginning to become not uncommon for multilateral treaties to contain 
provisions for “compulsory dispute settlement”.7 By this phrase I mean the possibility 
for either party to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of a particular 
treaty that has not been settled through negotiation or other agreed means to refer the 
dispute for settlement by a judicial body (the ICJ or an arbitral tribunal) without the 
consent of the other party to the dispute. As we will shortly see, the LOSC, unlike the 
1958 Conventions, provides for such compulsory settlement of disputes.  
There are various reasons why the LOSC continued a trend to include 
provisions for compulsory dispute settlement in multilateral treaties.8 First, a number 
of developed States, including the United Kingdom and the USA, made it clear that 
they could not accept some of the proposed substantive innovations in the LOSC, 
which they thought would produce disputes, without compulsory dispute settlement.9 
Second, it was thought that the possibility of compulsory dispute settlement would 
                                                                                                                                            
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning the Compulsory 
Settlement of Disputes (adopted 24 April 1963, entered into force 19 March 1967) 596 UNTS 487. 
Unlike the optional protocol to the Geneva Conventions, the optional protocols to the two Vienna 
Conventions have formed the jurisdictional basis for a number of cases referred to the ICJ.   
7 For examples from this period, see Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) (adopted 18 March 1965, entered into force 
14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 159, Art 64; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195, 
Art 22; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, Art. 66; and International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships (adopted 2 November 1973, entered into force 2 October 1983) 1340 UNTS 61, Art. 10. 
8 For an authoritative account of the negotiations leading to the inclusion of a compulsory dispute 
settlement system in the LOSC, see S Rosenne and LB Sohn (eds), United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. V (Martinus Nijhoff 1989), especially at 5-15. See also AO 
Adede, The System for Settlement of Disputes under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(Martinus Nijhoff 1987), Part I. For an excellent succinct and recent account by one of the participants 
in the negotiations, see D Anderson, ‘Peaceful Settlement of Disputes under UNCLOS’ in J Barrett and 
R Barnes (eds), Law of the Sea; UNCLOS as a Living Treaty (British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law 2016) 385, 386-92.   
9 Rosenne and Sohn, supra note 8, 6; C Chinkin, ‘Dispute Resolution and the Law of the Sea: Regional 
Problems and Prospects’ in J Crawford and DR Rothwell (eds), The Law of the Sea in the Asian-Pacific 
Region (Nijhoff 1995) 237, 245; AE Boyle, ‘Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: 
Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction’ (1997) 46 ICLQ 37, 38-9; Anderson, supra note 8, 389-
90.  
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protect the integrity of the LOSC text, particularly the many delicate compromises 
with which it abounds, prevent it from unravelling in the face of unilateral State 
action, and ensure its uniform interpretation.10 Thirdly, compulsory dispute settlement 
was seen by developing and weaker States as a means of countering the political, 
economic and military pressures of more powerful and developed States.11  
 Before providing for the possibility of compulsory dispute settlement in 
section 2 of Part XV, the LOSC sets out obligations relating to the settlement of 
disputes by consensual means in Section 1 of Part XV. The first provision of Section 
1, Article 279, requires States parties to “settle any dispute between them concerning 
the interpretation or application of this Conventions by peaceful means in accordance 
with Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United Nations and, to this end, [to] 
seek a solution by the means indicated in Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Charter.” The 
latter lists the peaceful means of dispute settlement referred to in Article 2(3) of the 
UN Charter. They are: “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful 
means of [the parties’] own choice.”  
Section 2 of Part XV of the LOSC goes on to provide what is to happen if the 
parties are unable to resolve a dispute consensually using one or more of these means. 
Article 286 is the crucial provision. It states: 
 
                                                 
10 See the Memorandum by the President of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Doc 
A/CONF.62/WP.9/Add 1 (1976), para 6, Official Records of the Third UN Conference on the Law of 
the Sea, Vol. V (United Nations 1976) 122. See also Adede, supra note 8, 241; Anderson, supra note 8, 
400. 
11 N Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University 
Press 2005) 52-53. See also TA Mensah, ‘The Role of Peaceful Dispute Settlement in Contemporary 
Ocean Policy and Law’ in D Vidas and W Østreng (eds), Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the 
Century (Kluwer 1999) 81, 82. 
6
Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation and application 
of this Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to 
section 1, be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or 
tribunal having jurisdiction under this section.   
 
The various elements of this provision require some explanation. Taking them in turn, 
section 3 sets out various exceptions to the compulsory dispute settlement system 
provided by Article 286.  First, Article 297 provides that a coastal State is “not 
obliged to accept” referral by another State with which it is in dispute to legally 
binding settlement of disputes concerning the exercise of its rights concerning 
fisheries and marine scientific research in its EEZ. Thus, coastal States may initiate 
judicial proceedings concerning their EEZ fisheries and scientific research rights, but 
may block cases being brought against them. The reason for this exception is said to 
be because of political sensitivity concerning the EEZ provisions of the LOSC, which 
represent a careful and delicate balance between the interests of coastal States and the 
interests of other States.12 Second, Article 298 provides that a State may at any time 
after signing the LOSC make a declaration stating that it does not accept compulsory 
dispute settlement in relation to disputes concerning maritime boundaries with 
neighbouring States or those involving historic bays or titles, disputes concerning 
military activities and certain kinds of law enforcement activities in the EEZ, and/or 
disputes in respect of which the Security Council is exercising the functions assigned 
to it by the UN Charter. Only about one fifth of the parties to the LOSC have so far 
made declarations under Article 298.13 The low number of declarations is rather 
surprising, as Article 298 is said to have been necessary in order to secure agreement 
                                                 
12 Klein, supra note 11, 125-6 and 225-6. 
13 For a list of declarations, see <www.un.org/depts/los/settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm> 
accessed 28 August 2016. 
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on the inclusion of a system of compulsory dispute settlement in the LOSC.14 More 
specifically, the reason why the delimitation of maritime boundaries may be excluded 
from compulsory settlement is because of the preference of many States to determine 
boundaries by direct negotiation rather than involving a third party and because of the 
degree of national interests involved in such determination.15 The exceptions relating 
to military activities, law enforcement and the Security Council reflect the political 
and security sensitivities of many States; the linkage between law enforcement and 
coastal State rights excluded from compulsory dispute settlement under Article 297; 
and a desire to avoid possible conflicts between the LOSC’s dispute settlement 
procedures and action taken by the Security Council.16 The small number of 
declarations under Article 298 suggests that the assumptions on which those 
exceptions are based may be questionable. Some of the matters excepted from 
compulsory judicial settlement under Articles 297 and 298, namely certain kinds of 
disputes relating to fisheries and marine scientific research in the EEZ and maritime 
boundary delimitation, are subject to compulsory conciliation.17 The latter functions 
in much the same way as compulsory conciliation under the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties and some other multilateral treaties,18 including the fact that the 
report of the conciliation commission setting out its recommendations for settlement 
is not binding. The only instance so far of these compulsory conciliation provisions 
being invoked occurred in April 2016 when Timor-Leste initiated compulsory 
conciliation proceedings against Australia over their maritime boundary.19 The 
                                                 
14 Rosenne and Sohn, supra note 8, 109-110; Klein, supra note 11, 256. 
15 Klein, supra note 11, 229, 256 and 262. 
16 Ibid, 284 291 and 308-9. 
17 Arts 297(2), 297(3) and 298(1)(a) and Annex V of the LOSC. 
18 See JG Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (5th edn, Cambridge University Press 2011) 69-74 
and 174-176.  
19 See Press Release of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of 22 August 2016, 
<www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1869> accessed 28 August 2016. In September the Conciliation 
Commission rejected Australia’s claim that it was not competent to conduct the conciliation: see 
8
exceptions in Articles 297 and 298 are discussed in more detail in the papers by 
Stephen Allen and Keyuan Zou in this Symposium. 
 The next phrase in Article 286 that requires comment is “any dispute 
concerning the interpretation and application of this Convention.” The ambit of this 
phrase has been the subject of considerable analysis in some of the cases. That case 
law is examined in the paper by James Harrison in this Symposium so there is no need 
for discussion of it here. 
 The final phrase in Article 286 that requires comment is “the court or tribunal 
having jurisdiction under this section.” What this “court or tribunal” is, is explained in 
Article 287. The latter lists four courts and tribunals: the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the ICJ, an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with 
Annex VII of the LOSC, and a special arbitral tribunal for certain kinds of dispute 
(fisheries, environmental, scientific research and navigation) constituted in 
accordance with Annex VIII. A State party to the LOSC may at any time specify one 
or more of those four fora as its preferred means for settling disputes. If the parties to 
a dispute have specified a preference for the same forum, that will be the forum for 
hearing the dispute. Where the parties’ choice of forum does not coincide, or where 
one or more of the parties to the dispute has not made a choice, the dispute will be 
dealt with by an Annex VII arbitral tribunal.20 As of 1 December 2016 only 47 of the 
168 States parties to the LOSC had made declarations.21 Statistically, therefore, the 
likelihood is that most disputes will be referred to Annex VII arbitration; and so far 
                                                                                                                                            
Decision on Australia’s Objections to Competence, 19 September 2016 
<www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1921> accessed 4 January 2017.  
20 UNCLOS, Art 287(1), (3), (4) and (5). 
21 This total includes the limited declarations as to subject matter made by Bangladesh, Panama and St. 
Vincent. The total does not include declarations made by Algeria, Cuba and Guinea-Bissau excluding 
use of the ICJ for the settlement of disputes either absolutely or without their consent. Details of the 
declarations made under Art. 297 are at 
<www.un.org/depts/los/settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm> accessed 28 August 2016.  
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this has in fact happened in practice, as will be explained below. Giving parties to the 
LOSC a choice of forum was necessary in order to obtain agreement on the inclusion 
of a system of compulsory dispute settlement in the LOSC as States were unable to 
agree on a single forum.22 It is therefore surprising that there have not been more 
declarations. This may be due as much to bureaucratic inertia in national governments 
as anything else.   
Of the four possible fora listed in Article 287, the ICJ requires little comment. 
Its role under Part XV of the LOSC is essentially no different to its role under any 
other compromissory clause in a treaty giving it jurisdiction in accordance with 
Article 36(1) of its Statute. Consequently it cannot hear disputes involving parties to 
the LOSC that are not parties to its Statute or otherwise entitled to appear before it. 
There are currently four such parties to the LOSC: the Cook Islands, the European 
Union (EU), Niue and the State of Palestine. Likewise little needs to be said about 
Annex VII arbitration, which functions very much like a typical inter-State 
arbitration. The ITLOS and Annex VIII arbitration require more comment. The 
ITLOS was created by the LOSC. It is largely modelled on the ICJ, but there are some 
significant differences. It has 21, rather than 15, judges, presumably in order to allow 
for somewhat greater geographical representation. The judges are elected, and the 
ITLOS as a whole is financed, by the States parties to the LOSC rather than the UN. 
Judges are required to be persons “enjoying the highest reputation for fairness and 
integrity and of recognised competence in the field of the law of the sea,”23 rather than 
simply international law, as is the case with the ICJ. One of the main reasons for 
establishing a new international court as an alternative to the ICJ was because at the 
time that the LOSC was being negotiated, there was considerable distrust of the ICJ 
                                                 
22 Adede, supra note 8, 49-54, 243-4 and 283; Anderson, supra note 8, 390.  
23 LOSC, Annex VI, Art 2(1). 
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by both developing States and the then Communist States.24 Developing States saw 
the ICJ as a legally conservative and Western-dominated body, especially following 
its decisions in the Northern Cameroons and South West Africa cases,25 which were 
given only a few years before the commencement of the Third UN Conference on the 
Law of the Sea. As for the then Communist States, they were ideologically opposed to 
the judicial settlement of disputes as it conflicted with their belief that international 
law should be based entirely on the consent of States.  
Annex VIII special arbitration was included in the LOSC to reflect the 
importance of scientific and technical issues in the kinds of disputes to which such 
arbitration applies and also in recognition of the value of fact-finding and inquiry as a 
means of settling such disputes.26 Annex VIII has several noteworthy features. 
Arbitrators are preferably to be chosen from four lists of experts in the fields of the 
categories of dispute covered by Annex VIII, drawn up and maintained by the FAO, 
UNEP, the Inter-Governmental Oceanographic Commission and the IMO, 
respectively. Each State party may nominate to each of these lists two experts in each 
field “whose competence in the legal, scientific or technical aspects of such field is 
established and generally recognised and who enjoy the highest reputation for fairness 
and integrity.”27 Thus, arbitrators need not be, and in most cases probably will not be, 
legally qualified. In addition to their normal arbitration function, Annex VIII tribunals 
may also be used at any time, if the parties to a dispute so agree, to “carry out an 
inquiry and establish the facts giving rise to the dispute,” and, if the parties so request, 
                                                 
24 Klein, supra note 11, 54-55; Anderson, supra note 8, 386.  
25 Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections) 
[1963] ICJ Rep 15; and South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia and Liberia v. South Africa) (Second Phase) 
[1966] ICJ Rep 6. 
26 Rosenne and Sohn, supra note 8, 441-445. 
27 LOSC, Annex VIII, Art 2(3). 
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to “formulate recommendations.”28 Thus, rather unusually, an Annex VIII tribunal 
may engage in both diplomatic and judicial means of dispute settlement. However, the 
chances of such a tribunal being used in any capacity are at present rather remote, as 
only 11 parties to the LOSC (three of which are land-locked) have chosen Annex VIII 
arbitration as a preferred means of settlement. 
 Returning to Article 286 in the light of the above commentary on its 
provisions, what the article essentially provides is that that any dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of the LOSC that cannot be settled by the parties to the 
dispute by diplomatic or judicial means of their own choice may, subject to the 
exceptions in Article 297 or 298 (if either party has made a declaration under the 
latter), be unilaterally referred by either party to the dispute to one of the four possible 
fora listed in Article 287 for a legally binding decision. It is thus a compromissory 
clause providing for compulsory judicial settlement of a fairly common kind. Such 
clauses were included in a number of multilateral treaties concluded before the 
LOSC29 and are found in many multilateral treaties concluded since.30 Indeed, in the 
first two cases ever heard by an international court, the Wimbledon and Mavrommatis 
cases,31 the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice was based on 
compromissory clauses that were essentially of the same nature as Article 286. 
 While from a legal point of view, there is nothing particularly novel or unusual 
about Article 286 (except perhaps the considerable choice of forum), achieving 
consensus at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea on the inclusion of 
                                                 
28 Ibid, Art 5. 
29 See note 7. 
30 For a list of multilateral treaties that include compulsory reference to the ICJ, see <www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=4> accessed 3 August 2016. For a list of multilateral 
treaties that provide for compulsory reference to arbitration, see <https://pca-
cpa.org/en/documents/other-conventions-and-rules/> accessed 29 August 2016. 
31 Case of the SS “Wimbledon” (Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan v. Germany) [1923] PCIJ Rep 
Series A No 1; and The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v. Great Britain) [1924] 
PCIJ Rep Series A No 2. 
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compulsory dispute settlement in the LOSC was a substantial political achievement, 
given that some of the Conference participants, the then Communist States and 
various developing States, tended at that time to be opposed to the inclusion of 
compulsory dispute settlement in multilateral treaties.32 It is an achievement, like the 
conclusion of the LOSC as a whole, that today, after more than 20 years of relatively 
successful operation, we may perhaps tend to take too much for granted.  
Unlike the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO)33 or the ICSID Convention,34 the LOSC dispute settlement 
system does not attempt to establish a monopoly for dealing with disputes concerning 
the interpretation and application of the LOSC, other than for disputes concerning 
seabed mining in the Area, for which the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber has in principle 
exclusive competence. Indeed, the LOSC emphasises that it is always open to the 
parties to agree a means of settlement other than those in Part XV.35 In practice this 
possibility is being used. For example, in 2014 Costa Rica and Somalia each chose to 
refer their maritime boundary delimitation disputes with, respectively, Nicaragua and 
Kenya to the ICJ under the optional clause (Article 36(2) of the ICJ’s Statute) rather 
than under Part XV of the LOSC. The reasons have not been made public. In the 
Somalia/Kenya case it may be that cost was a factor: if the dispute had been brought 
under Part XV of the LOSC, it would have been heard by an Annex VII tribunal, for 
whose costs the parties would have had to pay. Costa Rica, on the other hand, had 
little choice but to bring its case before the ICJ under the optional clause (and the Pact 
of Bogotá) because it had not made a declaration under Article 287, meaning that in 
                                                 
32 Anderson, supra note 8, 380-381. 
33 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2 Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures governing the Settlement of Disputes (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 
1995) (1995) 33 ILM 1125. 
34 Note 7, Arts 26-27. 
35 See Arts 280-2 of the LOSC and the discussion of these provisions in the paper by Nigel Bankes in 
this Symposium. 
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principle an Annex VII tribunal would have been the forum for hearing the case. 
However, Nicaragua has made a declaration under Article 298 accepting only the ICJ 
as the forum for the determination of maritime boundary disputes.  
Article 286 (together with Article 288(1), which provides that “[a] court or 
tribunal referred to in Article 287 shall have jurisdiction over any dispute concerning 
the interpretation and application of this Convention which has been submitted to it in 
accordance with this Part”) is, or ought to be, the lynchpin of Part XV, especially for 
determining whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction to hear a dispute concerning 
the interpretation and application of the LOSC. In practice, and in my view 
regrettably, Article 286 has at times not been applied correctly by judicial bodies in 
determining whether they have jurisdiction. While such bodies correctly consider 
whether a dispute exists, and, if so, whether it concerns the interpretation or 
application of the LOSC, and whether any of the exceptions in Articles 297 and 298 
apply, they do not always go on to consider, as Article 286 stipulates, whether “no 
settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1.” This provision surely requires a 
judicial body, in determining whether it has jurisdiction, to appraise what efforts the 
parties have made to settle the dispute by using the consensual means set out in 
section 1 of Part XV; and if no meaningful efforts have been made, to decline 
jurisdiction. However, judicial bodies tend not to do this but instead simply consider 
whether there has been an exchange of views between the parties “regarding its 
settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means,” as required by Article 283, the 
bare minimum of an exchange being regarded as sufficient to satisfy this 
requirement.36 This approach has been particularly evident in the case law of the 
                                                 
36 For a discussion of the case law on Article 283, see D Anderson, ‘Article 283 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea’ in TM Ndiaye and R Wolfrum (eds), Law of the Sea, 
Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: Liber Amicorum Thomas A. Mensah (Martinus Nijhoff 
2007) 847.  
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ITLOS on provisional measures, when the ITLOS determines whether prima facie it, 
or an Annex VII tribunal, as the case may be, has jurisdiction. Considering Article 
283 as a substitute for Article 286 matters less in provisional measures cases, but 
when it happens in the main proceedings of a case, its consequences may be serious. 
The most troubling example is the Arctic Sunrise case (Netherlands v. Russia). This 
case concerned the seizure and detention of the Greenpeace ship, the Arctic Sunrise, 
by Russia on 19 September 2013. The Netherlands, the flag State of the Arctic 
Sunrise, initiated arbitration against Russia before an Annex VII tribunal on 4 October 
2013. The tribunal did not consider at what point in time the dispute arose. In my 
view, the earliest that it could have arisen was 29 September, when for the first time 
the Netherlands protested the seizure of the Arctic Sunrise. More likely, it was on 3 
October, when the Netherlands informed Russia that it disagreed with the latter’s 
interpretation of the LOSC.37 Thus, there was either one day, or at most five days, 
between the dispute arising and the initiation of arbitral proceedings. It is difficult to 
see how in either time frame there could have been a meaningful attempt to settle the 
dispute in accordance with section 1 of Part XV, as Article 286 requires if an Annex 
VII tribunal is to have jurisdiction. However, the tribunal did not mention Article 286 
at all. Instead, it discussed the issue solely in terms of Article 283, reaching the 
conclusion that a note sent to Russia on 3 October 2013 by the Netherlands in which 
the latter stated that “there seems to be merit in submitting this dispute to arbitration” 
under the LOSC and that it “is considering initiating such arbitration as soon as 
feasible” amounted to an exchange of views for the purpose of Article 283, even 
                                                 
37 These events are recorded in para 61 of the tribunal’s award on jurisdiction: see In the Matter of the 
Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia) (Jurisdiction), 26 November 2014, 
<www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1325> accessed 29 August 2016. In his dissenting opinion in the 
provisional measures phase of the case before the ITLOS, Judge Golitsyn considered that the dispute 
arose on 3 October: see The “Arctic Sunrise” Case (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian 
Federation) (Provisional Measures), Order of 22 November 2013, dissenting opinion of Judge Golitsyn 
para. 12, ITLOS Reports 2013, 230. The ITLOS itself did not offer a view as to when the dispute arose. 
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though the tribunal acknowledged that this was the only communication between the 
parties regarding the means for settling the dispute  and that it was “brief, one-sided 
(in the sense that Russia did not make any counter-proposal or accept the proposal to 
arbitrate) and took place only a day before the commencement of arbitration. Such an 
exchange of views may not suffice in every case.”38 That last sentence must surely be 
correct if Article 283 is to mean anything. The “exchange of views” sufficed in the 
Arctic Sunrise case, according to the tribunal, because of “the urgency, from the 
perspective of the Netherlands, of securing the release of the Arctic Sunrise and its 
crew.”39 That appears almost to presuppose that Russia’s seizure and detention of the 
ship were illegal. The Arctic Sunrise case presents an interesting comparison with 
another case where Russia was also the defendant, Georgia v. Russia. In this case 
Georgia sought to found the jurisdiction of the ICJ on a compromissory clause in the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
that in its essence was very similar to Article 286 of the LOSC. The ICJ found that it 
lacked jurisdiction because the parties could not possibly have made a realistic effort 
to settle their dispute under the Convention in the three days between the time when 
the dispute arose and Georgia making its application to the ICJ.40              
  
 
Use of the general dispute settlement system of the LOSC  
 
                                                 
38 In the Matter of the Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia) (Merits), 14 August 2015, 
paras 152-3, <www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1438> accessed 29 August 2016. 
39 Ibid, para 154. 
40 Case concerning the Application of the International Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) (Preliminary Objections) [2011] ICJ Rep 70, 
135-140.  
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I turn now to consider the use that has so far been made of the general dispute 
settlement system of the LOSC since the entry into force of the LOSC in 1994. As far 
as section 1 of Part XV is concerned, there is no official record of the use that has 
been made of the various means of dispute settlement referred to in Article 279. A 
considerable number of disputes relating to the LOSC have been settled through 
negotiation (e.g. maritime boundaries and navigational disputes), and it is possible 
that a few disputes have been resolved through mediation or the agency of the UN or 
a regional organization. There do not, however, appear to be any examples of disputes 
relating to the LOSC being resolved through conciliation, inquiry or consensual 
judicial means.     
 With section 2 of Part XV, the position is different. Here there is a 
comprehensive public record of practice. I analyse this practice by considering first 
the number of cases, then the parties to the cases, and finally the subject matter of the 
cases.  
 
Number of cases 
From the entry into force of the LOSC in1994 up until 1 December 2016, 21 cases 
had been referred under Article 286 for judicial settlement (see Table 1 at the end of 
this paper). A decision on the merits had been given in 10 cases, seven cases had been 
disposed of without a decision on the merits, and four cases were pending. Of the 
seven cases that ended without a decision on the merits, two cases ended when the 
judicial body concerned found that it lacked jurisdiction, four cases were withdrawn 
at the joint request of the parties as they had reached an out-of-court settlement, and 
one case was withdrawn unilaterally (the MOX Plant case) because the applicant, 
Ireland, had breached EU law by bringing the case against a fellow EU Member State.  
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Of the total of 21 cases, 19 were initiated as arbitration under Annex VII of the 
LOSC, thus bearing out the point made earlier that the relatively small number of 
declarations by States selecting a preferred forum for the settlement of disputes means 
that statistically most cases will be referred to Annex VII arbitration. However, in five 
of those 19 cases the parties subsequently agreed to transfer proceedings to the 
ITLOS. In one of those transferred cases, the Virginia G case, the applicant, Panama, 
proposed to the defendant, Guinea-Bissau, that the case be transferred to the ITLOS 
because the dispute would then be resolved “in a less costly manner”.41 By this 
Panama presumably meant that the parties would not have to pay the fees and 
expenses of the arbitrators and a registrar and the cost of hiring premises for the 
arbitration: with the ITLOS, the equivalent costs are met from its budget, which is 
funded by all the parties to the LOSC. It may well be that such financial 
considerations were, in part at least, the reasons for the transfer of the other four cases 
to the ITLOS.  
Thus, Annex VII arbitral tribunals have dealt, or are dealing, with 14 of the 21 
cases. Not surprisingly, each of these 14 tribunals has been differently constituted. 
However, a relatively limited number of persons have been used as arbitrators – a 
total of 40, compared with a theoretical maximum of 63 if each tribunal had been 
completely differently constituted.42 There has been a core of five arbitrators, each of 
whom has sat in three or more cases. The trend towards the same people being used as 
arbitrators has become more pronounced in recent cases. A third of the arbitrators are 
                                                 
41 Letter of 3 June 2011 from Panama to Guinea-Bissau, attached to the Notification of Panama to the 
ITLOS 
<https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.19/Notification_submitted_by_Panam
a.pdf> accessed 5 January 2017.  
42 These figures refer to only 13 of the cases, as information on the arbitrators in the Ukraine v. Russia 
case was not available at the time of writing. The total number of possible arbitrators is 63 rather than 
65 (13 times five) because in the Duzgit Integrity case there were only three arbitrators compared with 
the normal five. 
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past or serving judges of the ITLOS. Part of the reason is probably because in the 
majority of the cases the parties have been unable to agree on the appointment of the 
three “neutral” arbitrators, who have consequently, in accordance with Article 3(e) of 
Annex VII of the LOSC, been appointed by the President of the ITLOS.  The factors 
mentioned may help to explain why in general there have been no significant 
differences in the interpretation and application of the LOSC, either between the 
tribunals or between the tribunals and the ITLOS, thus avoiding the fragmentation of 
the law that has occurred, for example, with the differently constituted arbitral 
tribunals dealing with investor-State disputes under the ICSID Convention.43 Another 
factor in promoting uniformity in the interpretation of the LOSC may be the lack of 
diversity in the composition of arbitral tribunals. Arbitrators are predominantly white, 
middle-aged (or older) men. There has so far been only one female arbitrator, Judge 
Elsa Kelly, who is also so far the only female ITLOS judge. 23 of the 40 people used 
as arbitrators are nationals of States that belong to the Eastern Europe and Western 
Europe and Others Groups of the UN, including four of the five arbitrators who have 
sat in three or more cases. Interestingly, in the one instance where there has been a 
significant divergence in the interpretation of the LOSC, which concerns Article 281, 
the tribunal taking the divergent view, that in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, 
contained no members who were or became ITLOS judges and only one member who 
sat in another Annex VII tribunal.44    
                                                 
43 UNCTAD, Reform of Investor Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap (2013) 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf> accessed 5 January 2017. 
44 For the view of the tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case on Art 281, see Southern Bluefin 
Tuna Case (Australia v. Japan; New Zealand v. Japan) (2000) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) XXIII 
RIAA 1, 42-46 (paras 55-65). For views of Art 281 that differ, see the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case 
(Australia v. Japan; New Zealand v. Japan) (Provisional Measures), Order of 27 August 1999 ITLOS 
Reports 1999, 280, paras 56-60; Arbitration between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago relating to 
the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (2006) XXVII RIAA 147, 
205-6 (para 200); and South China Sea Case (Philippines v. China) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) 
(2015), para 223-225, <http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506> accessed 8 January 2017. 
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No cases have yet been heard by either the ICJ or Annex VIII arbitration. The 
probable reason is the relatively small number of States choosing the ICJ and Annex 
VIII as a preferred means of settlement. 27 States have so far selected the ICJ as a 
preferred means. Of these States, 16 are members of the EU. The competence of EU 
Member States to engage in LOSC litigation is restricted by the fact that the EU has 
exclusive competence in some matters covered by the LOSC (notably fisheries).45 In 
relation to these matters EU Member States therefore have no competence to engage 
in litigation. Furthermore, under EU law, an EU Member State is generally precluded 
from using the dispute settlement procedures of the LOSC for settling a dispute with 
another EU Member State relating to the LOSC and instead must use the Court of 
Justice of the European Union.46 These factors reduce the likelihood of the ICJ being 
used to settle LOSC disputes under Part XV. As for Annex VIII special arbitration, as 
mentioned earlier, only 11 States have selected it as a preferred means, and of these 
States, three are landlocked.   
Should we be surprised, or even disappointed, that there have not been more 
than 21 cases? In my view we should not. The settlement of disputes between States 
by judicial means has traditionally been exceptional, haphazard and sporadic, and this 
continues very largely to be the case, notwithstanding the considerable increase in the 
number of international courts in the past two decades.47 Thus, since the LOSC came 
into force in 1994, only 60 cases (excluding requests for the interpretation or revision 
of previous judgments) have been brought before the ICJ (17 of which are multiple 
                                                 
45 See the EU’s declaration made on becoming a party to the LOSC 
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm> accessed 5 
August 2016. 
46 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (adopted 13 December 2007, entered into force 1 
December 2009) [2010] OJ C83/47, Art. 344, as interpreted and applied by the Court of Justice in Case 
C-459/03, Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635.  
47 According to Karen Alter, there are “now at least twenty-four permanent international courts”: see 
KJ Alter, The New Terrain of International Law (Princeton University Press 2014) 4. The 
overwhelming majority of the thousands of cases decided by these courts are disputes between natural 
or legal persons and States or prosecutions of natural persons before international criminal courts.  
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applications, i.e. a State institutes proceedings concerning the same dispute against a 
number of defendant States),48 even though the ICJ has a much broader base of 
jurisdiction than the LOSC judicial bodies;49 approximately 11 inter-State disputes 
have been determined by arbitration;50 and a handful of inter-State cases have been 
dealt with by regional human rights courts and the courts of regional economic co-
operation/integration organizations. The one exception to the relative rarity of inter-
State litigation is the DSU of the WTO. Since the DSU came into being, six weeks 
after the LOSC entered into force and with roughly the same number of parties, and 
up until the end of 2014, there had been 162 panel rulings (i.e. judicial decisions).51 
Unlike the LOSC dispute settlement system, the DSU applies to the settlement of 
disputes relating not to a single treaty, but to the 20 “covered agreements” of the 
WTO. However, collectively those 20 agreements probably contain no greater number 
of treaty articles than the LOSC and its annexes. Furthermore, a high proportion of 
panel rulings relate to a single agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade,52 so overall the DSU experience is very different from that of the LOSC. On 
occasions it is suggested that the DSU shows that international litigation “works” and 
is something to be emulated. There is, however, another way of looking at the 
operation of the DSU. This is that it suggests that the provisions of the WTO covered 
                                                 
48 For a list of the cases, see <www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2> accessed 5 August 
2016. Ten of the 60 cases are law of the sea cases. 
49 The ICJ’s jurisdictional bases comprise, according to Article 36 of its Statute, cases referred to it by 
special agreement; compromissory clauses in pre-existing treaties, of which there are several hundred 
(for a list, see <www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=4> accessed 3 August 2016); 
and declarations made by States under the so-called optional clause (Article 36(2) of the Statute), of 
which there are currently 72 (for a list, see <www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3> accessed 5 August 2016).  
50 This is the number of cases (excluding Annex VII arbitrations) listed on the website of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), <https://pcacases.com/web/allcases/> accessed 5 August 2016. 
There may have been a small number of arbitrations that are not listed there. Annex VII arbitrations 
therefore account for more than half of the inter-State arbitrations initiated since the entry into force of 
the LOSC that are listed on the PCA’s website. Of the 11 non-Annex VII arbitrations, four concern the 
law of the sea. 
51 K Leitner and S Lester, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement 1995-2014 – A Statistical Analysis’ (2015) 18 
Journal of International Economic Law 203, 209.  
52 Ibid, 208. 
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agreements are either not very clearly drafted or that WTO members are not very 
good at complying with those agreements or, more likely, that it is a combination of 
the two. While it may be true that resort to litigation occurs more readily in WTO 
disputes than in most other kinds of disputes because there is more at stake 
economically, there still has to be a dispute in the first place.      
There are a number of reasons why, with the exception of WTO disputes, 
States generally prefer to avoid the use of international courts and tribunals to settle 
their disputes and use diplomatic means (primarily negotiations) instead. Such means 
allow States to retain control of the dispute – international litigation can be 
unpredictable – and make it easier for them to compromise as, unlike an international 
court, they are not bound by strict rules of law and the parameters of the dispute. 
Diplomatic means are cheaper and often will be quicker than litigation, and allow 
States to avoid the possibly unwelcome publicity that may come with litigation. States 
will not be keen to litigate if they think that they may lose or that relations with the 
State with whom they are in dispute will significantly worsen as a consequence of 
litigation. They are only likely to litigate if they think that they will win or are 
prepared to lose, or if they desire a legally binding or certain outcome (as with a 
maritime boundary, for example), or if it is evident that there is no prospect of settling 
by diplomatic means a dispute whose resolution is seen as essential. Weaker States in 
asymmetric power relationships with States with which they have a dispute will tend 
to favour judicial means over negotiations, where a more powerful State will be able 
more easily to press its view. States may also litigate for domestic political purposes – 
to show domestic stakeholders adversely affected by a dispute that something is being 
done to advance their cause or so that blame for an inevitably unpopular outcome can 
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be attached to an international court (as in the Gulf of Maine case,53 for example).  All 
these factors help to explain why more disputes concerning the LOSC have not been 
referred for judicial settlement under section 2 of Part XV. In addition, it may be that 
the possibility of such unilateral referral has induced the settlement of some disputes 
by consensual means in order to avoid litigation, although I am not aware of any such 
cases. It may also be that the existence of the exceptions to compulsory dispute 
settlement in Articles 297 and 298 has led to some disputes not being referred to 
judicial settlement that might otherwise might have been, although again I am not 
aware of any such instances.  
In recent years there has been a significant increase in the rate at which cases 
have been referred for judicial settlement under section 2 of Part XV of the LOSC. 
Fourteen of the 21 cases have been referred in the past seven years, compared with 
seven cases brought in the previous 15 years. It may therefore be that in the not too 
distant future the extent to which the LOSC judicial bodies are used will be rather 
greater than has been the case up to now. Certainly, there continues to be no shortage 
of disputes. There are, for example, some 200 areas where the maritime zones of two 
or more States overlap and where no boundary has yet been agreed, and where in 
many cases the parties actively disagree over the location of the boundary. 
Furthermore, the LOSC suffers from widespread systemic non-compliance, including 
illegitimately drawn baselines, claims to coastal State jurisdiction in the contiguous 
zone and EEZ in excess of that permitted by the LOSC, illegal fishing, the use of sub-
standard ships, etc.54 Such non-compliance is regularly protested by other States (thus 
                                                 
53 Gulf of Maine case (Canada/USA) (Merits) [1984] ICJ Rep 246; T McDorman, Saltwater Neighbors: 
International Ocean Law Relations between the United States and Canada (OUP 2009) 140. 
54 For more details, see R Churchill, ‘Compliance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
Problems and Prospects’ in H-J Koch, D König, J Sanden and R Verheyen (eds), Legal Regimes for 
Environmental Protection: Governance for Climate Change and Ocean Resources (Brill 2015) 288, 
290-3; and JA Roach and RW Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims (3rd edn, Martinus Nijhoff 2012). 
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indicating a dispute55), but has hardly ever, so far, been followed up by recourse to the 
compulsory dispute settlement procedures of the LOSC. A former president of the 
Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea has bemoaned such instances of non-
compliance, and called for more of them to be protested and followed by the 
institution of judicial proceedings.56 However, unless a State has been directly and 
adversely affected by such systemic non-compliance, it is unlikely to want to incur the 
cost and bother of litigation. On the other hand, thanks to recent developments in the 
law, it is no longer necessary for a State to show that it has a legal interest in the 
alleged non-compliance when commencing litigation. The ICJ has held, reflecting 
Article 48 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility,57 that any party to a multilateral treaty may bring proceedings before 
an international court alleging non-compliance with that treaty by another party 
without having to show that it has been specially affected by such non-compliance.58   
But back to the present, and the question of whether we should be 
disappointed at the number of cases, even if not surprised. Some academics may be 
disappointed that there have not been more cases to illustrate the meaning of some of 
the still ambiguous and unclear provisions of the LOSC, or more cases to comment on 
– although the 2016 award in the South China Sea case should keep some academics 
going for some considerable time. The cost-conscious may be concerned that the 
                                                 
55 In international law a dispute, according to the ICJ, is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a 
conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons, where the claim of one person is positively 
opposed by the other. See Georgia v. Russia, supra note 40 at 84, for a summary of the ICJ’s case law 
on this matter.  
56 TBB Koh (untitled) in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea at Thirty: Reflections 
(United Nations 2013) 105, 106 <www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/international-
law-and-justice/united-nations-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea-at-thirty_1b866746-
en#.WG5if014iUk#page113> accessed 5 January 2017. 
57 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II (Part II), 31. 
58 See Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) (Merits) 
[2012] ICJ Rep 422, 449-50 (paras. 66-69); and Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New 
Zealand intervening) (Merits) [2014] ICJ Rep 226. In the latter case the ICJ simply assumed that 
Australia had standing to challenge Japan’s alleged non-compliance with the International Convention 
for the Regulation of Whaling, without discussing the matter. 
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ITLOS, whose running costs are around €10.5 million a year,59 has not had more 
business, although it should be pointed out that it has had more than the seven cases 
referred to above. It has also dealt with nine applications for prompt release; made 
nine provisional measures orders (six in cases being heard by Annex VII arbitral 
tribunals and three in the cases that it itself has dealt with); and given two advisory 
opinions.60 Nevertheless, this still averages out at only around one case a year.  
However, any concerns about the relatively small number of cases that have 
been referred for judicial settlement under Part XV of the LOSC are largely 
misplaced. What is important is that disputes are settled peacefully; the means by 
which they are settled is a secondary issue. Disputes that remain unresolved are likely 
to cause increasing tensions between the States concerned, and may risk spilling over 
into the use of force. A solution to a dispute that is freely negotiated will probably 
give each State something of what it is looking for and is likely to be complied with. 
Neither of these things will necessarily happen with litigation. One should therefore 
beware of thinking that judicial settlement is inherently superior to other means of 
dispute settlement.61 However, rather than relying solely on negotiations to resolve 
disputes, States should be more willing to explore the possibilities of using third party 
diplomatic means. For disputes that involve incidents at sea, where the parties 
disagree as to what actually happened, as for example in the Enrica Lexie and Arctic 
Sunrise cases, inquiry, which in the past has often been used to resolve disputes over 
                                                 
59 Report of the Twenty-Sixth Meeting of States Parties, SPLOS/303 (2016), 8 < https://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/245/62/PDF/N1624562.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 5 January 
2017. By way of comparison, the ICJ currently costs around US$26 million a year. 
60 See the list of ITLOS cases at <www.itlos.org/cases/list-of-cases/> accessed 31 August 2016.  
61 Interestingly, Judge David Anderson, who has a long experience of being both a negotiator (as a 
legal adviser at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office for many years) and an international judge 
(as a member of the ITLOS), considers that negotiation is the preferred means to settle disputes: see 
Anderson, supra note 8, 413. 
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incidents at sea where the parties disagree as to what occurred,62 may well be a more 
suitable remedy than litigation.       
 
Participants in LOSC litigation 
Turning now from the number of cases to the States that have been parties to them, 
Table 2 (at the end of this paper) shows participation by States parties in LOSC 
litigation in terms of the informal geo-political groups into which the UN divides its 
members.63 Nine States have been parties to two cases, while 25 have been parties to 
a single case. The 34 States that have so far participated in LOSC litigation constitute 
just under 20 per cent of the parties to the LOSC. Of the nine States that have been 
involved in two cases, three (Bangladesh, Panama and St Vincent) were the applicant 
in both cases, while the remaining States were either the defendant in both cases (the 
EU, India, Russia and the United Kingdom) or the applicant in one case and the 
defendant in the other (Ghana and Italy). This does not suggest that any particular 
State party is especially litigious. Litigants are spread fairly evenly among the UN’s 
geo-political groups, with the exception of the East European group: however, the 
latter’s membership is considerably smaller than most other UN groups. One should 
beware of reading too much into the figures in Table 2, particularly the propensity or 
otherwise for States from a particular region to engage in LOSC litigation. The 
numbers of cases and litigants are too small for any conclusions of this kind to be 
drawn.             
                                                 
62 For example, the Dogger Bank, the Red Crusader and Mavi Marmara incidents. On the first two, see 
Merrills, supra note 18, 42-4 and 48-51; on the third, see Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of 
Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident, September 2011 
<www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle_east/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf> accessed 8 January 
2017. 
63 The discrepancy shown in Table 2 between the number of applicants and the number of respondents 
is due to the fact that in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case there were two applicants (Australia and New 
Zealand), but only one respondent (Japan).   
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 Subject matter of the cases 
Table 3 shows, in a somewhat simplified fashion, the subject matter of the 21 cases 
that have so far been brought before LOSC judicial bodies.64 Nearly 40 per cent of the 
cases have been brought by a flag State alleging that one of its vessels has been seized 
and detained by a coastal State in violation of the LOSC,65 while nearly 25 per cent 
concern maritime boundary delimitation. Between them these two categories account 
for eight of the ten cases for which a decision on the merits has been given. An 
informed observer at the time of the conclusion of the LOSC in 1982 would probably 
have been surprised if he or she had been told that nearly two-thirds of the first 21 
cases would concern the detention of vessels and maritime boundary delimitation. 
Such an observer would probably have assumed that most disputes over the detention 
of vessels would have been resolved under the prompt release procedures of Article 
292. Furthermore, our observer would probably have assumed that the possibility for 
States to opt out of the compulsory dispute settlement procedures for maritime 
boundary disputes would mean that there would be few, if any, cases on this subject. 
With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that few States have exercised that 
option, and that even where they have, they may later withdraw their opt out and 
bring a case before a judicial body for a maritime boundary to be determined where 
they consider that that is in their interest, as Ghana has done in the case of its 
maritime boundary dispute with Côte d’Ivoire. We also now know that maritime 
boundary delimitation has become one of most popular subjects for litigation before 
the ICJ..  
                                                 
64 I have listed each case under a single heading, even though some cases cover more than one subject, 
labelling the case by what I consider to be its predominant subject matter.  
65 For the avoidance of doubt, it should be made clear that these cases are quite distinct from the 
prompt release of vessel cases brought under Art. 292 of the LOSC, which are discussed in the paper 
by Seline Trevisanut below.  
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Instead, our observer of 1982 might have expected that most cases would have 
concerned disputes of the kind that prompted the inclusion of Part XV in the LOSC, 
in other words disputes over the interpretation and application of the innovative and 
compromise provisions of the LOSC or between weak and powerful States. In 
practice, relatively few cases have so far been of these kinds. While it is obviously a 
rather subjective judgment to decide whether a particular case falls within either of 
these categories, arguably the only cases that fall into the first category are the Saiga 
No 2 and Virginia G cases (on the nature of coastal State rights in the EEZ – the 
Enrica Lexie case may also turn out to be of this kind, depending on how the arbitral 
tribunal finds the facts), the maritime boundary cases, and the South China Sea case 
(on the distinction between uninhabitable rocks and other islands). Most disputes 
concerning the innovative and compromise provisions of the LOSC or the meaning of 
its provisions that are unclear or ambiguous have not been litigated and remain 
unresolved: instead States parties have preferred to protest against the claims of others 
that they consider to be inconsistent with the LOSC and assert their own position. As 
regards disputes between weak and powerful States, only five disputes at most fall 
within this category, namely the MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Swordfish 
(Chile v. EU), Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. UK), South China Sea 
(Philippines v. China) and Ukraine v. Russia cases. While the Chagos MPA case is 
clearly a David v. Goliath type of case, the essence of the dispute was not really about 
the LOSC at all but about sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago, the LOSC dispute 
settlement system being used by Mauritius, ultimately unsuccessfully, as a means to 
try to resolve the sovereignty dispute. Likewise, the Ukraine v. Russia case also 
appears to be an attempt to use the LOSC to resolve what is in essence a territorial 
dispute, the Russian annexation of Crimea. 
28
Looking in a little more detail at the cases that have been brought, the cases 
that concern the seizure and detention of foreign vessels are a mixed bunch. Three 
cases concern the seizure and detention of tankers supplying oil to foreign vessels in 
the EEZ or archipelagic waters (the Saiga No 2, Virginia G and Duzgit Integrity 
cases). The other three decided cases concern the seizure and detention of a foreign 
vessel following the alleged search for archaeological remains in the territorial sea 
and internal waters (the Louisa case), protest against Russian hydrocarbon activity in 
the Arctic (the Arctic Sunrise), and alleged non-payment of a debt by the flag State 
(the Libertad). In the two pending cases the facts are contested by the parties and still 
have to be established judicially.  
The four decided maritime boundary cases have followed the jurisprudence of 
the ICJ in delimiting the single maritime boundary within 200 nautical miles (nm) of 
the baseline, but have broken new ground in delimiting continental shelf boundaries 
beyond 200 nm (the Bangladesh/Myanmar and Bangladesh/India cases) and in 
interpreting the provisions of the LOSC dealing with provisional arrangements 
pending determination of a boundary and the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper 
the reaching of a boundary agreement (the Guyana/ Suriname case). Of the three 
fisheries cases, two concerned the obligation to cooperate over the conservation and 
management of highly migratory species (the Southern Bluefin Tuna and Swordfish 
cases), while the third case was about the obligation in Article 63(1) of the LOSC to 
cooperate over the conservation and management of shared stocks (the Atlanto-
Scandian Herring case). None of these cases ended with a decision on the merits, so 
the scope of the obligations concerned was not clarified. Of the three environmental 
cases, the two that ended without a decision on the merits concerned potential 
pollution of the Irish Sea by nuclear matter (the MOX Plant case) and Singapore’s 
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land reclamation activities in the Straits of Johor (the Land Reclamation case). The 
third case, the Chagos MPA case, although labelled as an environmental one, was in 
reality primarily a sovereignty dispute (as explained above) and the arbitral tribunal’s 
award has little to say about the environmental provisions of the LOSC. The South 
China Sea award also dealt with environmental matters, particularly obligations in the 
LOSC relating to rare and fragile ecosystems, as well as a variety of other issues, 
including historic rights and titles, the distinction between uninhabitable rocks and 
other islands, and the legal significance of low-tide elevations. The notification and 
statement of claim in the Ukraine v. Georgia case were not publicly available at the 
time of writing, so I do not yet know what issues of the LOSC have been raised in this 
case.   
Lay persons, and some international lawyers, tend to assume that once an 
international court or tribunal has given a decision on the merits of a case, the dispute 
in question has been resolved. Such an assumption is far from being correct in relation 
to disputes decided under Part XV of the LOSC. At least five of the ten decisions on 
the merits have given rise to problems of compliance (I do not know what the position 
is in relation to the other five cases). In the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago case the 
arbitral tribunal determined that the boundary between the EEZs and continental 
shelves of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago terminated in the east where it 
intersected the previously agreed boundary between Trinidad and Tobago and 
Venezuela.66 That point was within 200 nm of the baselines of Trinidad and Tobago, 
thus cutting off Trinidad and Tobago from any continental shelf beyond. 
Nevertheless, that has not prevented Trinidad and Tobago subsequently making a 
submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in which it 
                                                 
66 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago case, supra note 44, paras 374 and 381-2.  
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effectively ignores the arbitral tribunal’s award.67 In the two Bay of Bengal cases the 
ITLOS and an Annex VII arbitral tribunal determined the boundaries between the 
continental shelves beyond 200 nm of Bangladesh and Myanmar and Bangladesh and 
India, respectively. In a note of 22 October 2015 to the UN Secretary-General, 
Bangladesh argues that Myanmar’s revised submission to the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf, following the judgment of the ITLOS, is not in 
conformity with that judgment.68 Notwithstanding the award of the Annex VII 
tribunal, Bangladesh has not yet withdrawn its objection to the Commission 
considering the submission of India, presumably because it regards India’s 
submission, made in 2009 and not (yet) subsequently revised, as being incompatible 
with the tribunal’s award.69  
The best-known cases of non-compliance concern the Arctic Sunrise and 
South China Sea cases. In both cases the defendants, Russia and China respectively, 
refused to participate in the proceedings before the Annex VII arbitral tribunals, and 
immediately the latter delivered their awards, announced that they did not accept the 
tribunals’ decisions.70 These actions are clearly a major blow to the integrity, 
                                                 
67 The submission is at 
<www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/tto49_09/tto2009executive_summary.pdf> 
accessed 5 September 2016. See in particular pp. 14-18. 
68 The note is at 
<www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mmr08/2015_10_22_BGD_NV_UN.pdf> 
accessed 5 September 2016.  
69 See information at 
<www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_ind_48_2009.htm> accessed 5 
September 2016. 
70 Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China on the Award of 12 
July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Request of the 
Republic of the Philippines, 12 July 2016 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1379492.shtml > accessed 8 January 2017; and 
Commentary of the Official Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
M.V. Zakharova Regarding the Arbitral Award in the Case of the Arctic Sunrise (25 August 2015) (in 
Russian at <www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1707214> 
accessed 8 January 2017, as quoted in AG Oude Elferink, ‘The Russian Federation and the Arctic 
Sunrise Case: Hot Pursuit and Other Issues under the LOSC’ (2016) 92 International Law Studies 381, 
383. Although not accepting the tribunal’s 2015 award in the Arctic Sunrise case, Russia has in practice 
complied with the ruling because it had already released the Arctic Sunrise and its crew from detention 
well before the tribunal’s ruling. However, in its 2015 award the tribunal reserved the matter of 
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authority and legitimacy of the LOSC dispute settlement system. It remains to be seen 
how serious this will be, and whether it will fatally undermine the LOSC system. 
Some grounds for optimism are provided by the experience of the ICJ. In the 1970s 
and 1980s there were half a dozen cases brought before the ICJ where the defendant 
State refused to appear or abide by the subsequent judgment. As with the current 
situation concerning the LOSC, two of those cases concerned permanent members of 
the Security Council – France in the Nuclear Tests cases71 and the USA in the 
Nicaragua case.72 At the time there were widespread concerns expressed for the 
future of the ICJ. However, the ICJ recovered from that experience and there have 
been no cases of States refusing to appear since the 1980s. Arguably, the ICJ enjoys 
today as great a prestige and authority as at any time in its history.      
It is interesting to view the actions of Russia and China in the Arctic Sunrise 
and South China Sea cases in the light of a joint Declaration on the Promotion of 
International Law, issued by the two States on 25 June 2016.73 The Declaration 
contains an interesting and important paragraph on dispute settlement, which in part 
reads as follows: 
 The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China reaffirm the 
principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and express their firm conviction 
that States shall resolve their disputes through dispute settlement means and 
mechanisms that they have agreed upon . . . It is crucial for the maintenance of 
international legal order that all dispute settlement means and mechanisms are 
                                                                                                                                            
possible compensation for Russia’s illegal acts for further determination, which had not yet occurred at 
the time of writing. Thus, it remains to be seen what Russia’s response will be to any ruling that it 
should pay compensation to the Netherlands.   
71 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) [1974] ICJ Rep 253; Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. 
France) [1974] ICJ Rep 457. 
72 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA) (Merits) [1986] 
ICJ Rep 14. 
73 At <https://www.lawfareblog.com/text-russia-china-joint-declaration-promotion-and-principles-
international-law> accessed 11 August 2016. 
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based on consent and used in good faith and in the spirit of cooperation, and 
their purposes shall not be undermined by abusive practices.74 
The paragraph refers to dispute settlement being based on agreement and consent. Of 
course, in becoming parties to the LOSC, Russia and China agreed to its system of 
dispute settlement. However, the references to agreement and consent in the 
Declaration should perhaps be taken as meaning consent to a particular form of 
settlement for a specific dispute, rather than consent being given in the abstract and in 
advance by ratifying the LOSC. The Declaration also contains a paragraph on the 
LOSC, which reads: 
The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China emphasize the 
important role of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
in maintaining the rule of law relating to activities in the Oceans. It is of 
utmost importance that the provisions of this universal treaty are applied 
consistently, in such a manner that does not impair rights and legitimate 
interests of States Parties and does not compromise the integrity of the legal 
regime established by the Convention.75 
A key phrase here is “legitimate interests of States parties”, consistently with which, 
the Declaration asserts, the LOSC must be applied. The relevance of this to the South 
China Sea case, in particular, is very obvious. The response of China to the South 
China Sea award presents an interesting contrast with its behaviour in the WTO, 
membership of which also requires advance acceptance of compulsory dispute 
settlement. Although China has lost a number of cases under the DSU, it has to date 
complied with all the rulings against it.76 These cases generally have great economic 
                                                 
74 Para 5 of the Declaration. 
75 Para. 9 of the Declaration. 
76 For a list of cases brought against China, see 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm> accessed 5 September 2016. 
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significance and therefore could also be described as relating to its “legitimate 
interests.” 
The failure of Russia and China to accept the awards in the Arctic Sunrise and 
South China Sea cases draws attention to the fact that the LOSC contains no 
mechanism designed to ensure compliance with judicial decisions given under Part 
XV. In this respect it differs, formally at least, from the ICJ and the WTO’s DSU. In 
the case of the ICJ, Article 94(2) of the UN Charter provides that if a losing State fails 
to comply with a judgment, the UN Security Council “may, if it deems necessary, 
make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the 
judgment.” In the 70 years of the ICJ’s existence, this provision has never been used, 
even though there have been quite a number of cases where a losing party has failed 
to comply with a judgment. In the case of the WTO, Article 22 of the DSU allows a 
winning State to take retaliatory action against a losing State that has not complied 
with a ruling of a panel or the Appellate Body. This is effectively a form of 
institutional counter-measures. With the LOSC, it would be possible for a winning 
State to take counter-measures against a losing State that failed to comply with a 
judgment of the ITLOS or an Annex VII tribunal, as such failure would be a breach of 
Article 296(1) of LOSC. However, as has been discovered with the DSU, it is often 
difficult in practice for a weak State to employ counter-measures against a powerful 
State, either because it cannot take action on a scale that is likely to be effective or 
because it risks harming itself.77 Although at the regional level there are examples of 
                                                                                                                                            
Click on individual cases to find China’s response. As regards Russia’s practice in the DSU, at the time 
of writing, there had been only definitive ruling against it, but the period of time for implementation of 
the panel’s report had not expired.  
77 For an example, see DS285 United States – Measures affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, where it was very difficult for Antigua to take effective action against 
the USA. Details of the case are available at: 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm> accessed 5 September 2016. See 
also H Mahncke, ‘Sovereignty and Developing Countries: Current Status and Future Prospects at the 
WTO’ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 395, 407-8. 
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mechanisms that are effective in compelling States to comply with court judgments, 
for example the Court of Justice of the European Union may fine States that do not 
comply with its judgments,78 it seems impossible to see such mechanisms being 
introduced into global dispute settlement systems.  
The only mechanism at the global level that seems to be fairly effective in 
securing compliance with international obligations, albeit not obligations to comply 
with judicial decisions, is the non-compliance procedures found in several multilateral 
environmental agreements, where non-compliance may be sanctioned by the 
withdrawal of benefits, such as voting rights and financial and technical assistance. In 
theory the LOSC Meeting of States Parties could possibly serve as such a mechanism 
in relation to non-compliance with the decisions of LOSC judicial bodies. However, it 
currently lacks an explicit power to do so. It seems very unlikely that it would be 
prepared to consider itself as having an implied competence for this purpose, given 
the opposition of many State parties to any enlargement of the role of the Meeting of 
States Parties.79 In any case the only kind of sanction that the Meeting of States 
Parties would seem able to impose on a State that was not complying with a judicial 
decision given under Part XV would be to withdraw its right to vote in elections for 
members of the ITLOS and to participate in the determination of its budget. Such a 
sanction is unlikely to be effective.                  
Just as it should not be assumed that a decision on the merits will resolve a 
dispute, so it should also not be assumed that litigation that does not result in a 
decision on the merits is without relevance to the resolution of the dispute. In three of 
the seven completed LOSC cases that did not result in a decision on the merits, 
                                                 
78 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 46, Art 260. 
79 See RR Churchill, ‘The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ in DR Rothwell, 
AG Oude Elferink, KN Scott and T Stephens (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (OUP 
2015) 24, 41. 
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litigation contributed to the solution of the dispute. This came about because of the 
power of the ITLOS under Article 290(5) of the LOSC to prescribe provisional 
measures where the Annex VII arbitral tribunal hearing the case is yet to be 
constituted. The ITLOS has at times used this power to play a conflict-management 
role and to engender better relations between the parties to the dispute, albeit that at 
times its actions seem difficult to reconcile with a strict reading of Article 290. The 
first of the three cases where ITLOS provisional measures helped to settle the dispute 
was the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, in which Australia and New Zealand claimed 
that an experimental fishing programme for southern bluefin tuna by Japan breached 
obligations of the LOSC relating to the conservation and management of highly 
migratory species. Although the arbitral tribunal hearing the case subsequently found 
that it lacked jurisdiction,80 the provisional measures earlier prescribed by the ITLOS, 
which required the parties to avoid action that would aggravate the dispute, limit their 
catches and resume negotiations on conservation and management measures without 
delay, prompted the parties towards renewing such negotiations in a more co-
operative spirit and have been credited by several commentators with playing a 
significant role in the eventual resolution of the dispute.81 Second, in the Land 
Reclamation case, the ITLOS ordered the parties to enter into consultations to 
establish a group of independent experts to conduct a study to determine the effects of 
Singapore’s land reclamation activities on the marine environment of the Straits of 
Johor and to propose, as appropriate, measures to deal with any adverse effects of 
                                                 
80 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, supra note 44. 
81 See, for example, B Mansfield, ‘Compulsory Dispute Settlement after the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Award’ in AG Oude Elferink and DR Rothwell (eds), Oceans Management in the 21st Century: 
Institutional Frameworks and Responses (Martinus Nijhoff 2004) 255, 259-261 and 263-269; and T 
Stephens, ‘The Limits of International Adjudication in International Law: Another Perspective on the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case’ (2004) 19 IJMCL 177, 183-187. 
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such reclamation. 82 Proceedings before the Annex VII Tribunal that was due to deal 
with the merits phase of the case were effectively suspended while the group of 
independent experts established pursuant to the ITLOS Order carried out its work. On 
the basis of a report from the group, the parties were able to conclude an agreement 
that constituted a full and final settlement of the dispute.83 The third case where 
ITLOS provisional measures helped to settle the dispute was the Libertad case, which 
concerned the detention of an Argentinian naval training vessel in a port in Ghana 
pursuant to an order from a Ghanaian court in order to satisfy payment of an 
Argentinian government debt. The ITLOS made a provisional measure ordering the 
release of the vessel.84  Ghana complied with the order four days after it was made, 
thus effectively resolving the dispute.85 The parties subsequently requested the Annex 
VII tribunal to terminate proceedings.86 In the other two cases that were settled, the 
Swordfish and Atlanto-Scandian Herring cases, it may be that the institution of 
proceedings under the LOSC (and also of parallel proceedings under the DSU of the 
WTO) induced the parties to settle, but I am not aware of any information that 




                                                 
82 Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor  
(Malaysia v. Singapore) (Provisional Measures), Order of 8 October 2003 ITLOS Reports 2003, 10, 
para 106.  
83 Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor  
(Malaysia v. Singapore), Award on Agreed Terms of 1 September 2005 
<http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1126> accessed 8 January 2017. The text of the Settlement 
Agreement is annexed to the Award. 
84 The “ARA Libertad” Case (Argentina v. Ghana) (Provisional Measures), Order of 15 December 
2012, ITLOS Reports 2012, 332.   
85 Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for 2012, UN Doc SPLOS/256 
(2013), para 71 
<http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/annual_reports/annual_report_2012.pdf> accessed 8 
January 2017. 
86 <http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/429> accessed 8 January 2017. 
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 Shorn of its detail, the system of compulsory dispute settlement found in section 2 of 
Part XV of the LOSC amounts to a fairly standard kind of compromissory clause: 
disputes that cannot be settled by consensual means may be unilaterally referred by 
either party to the dispute to binding judicial settlement. Whereas most compulsory 
dispute settlement clauses in treaties provide for referral either to the ICJ and/or 
arbitration, the LOSC provides for referral to a choice of four possible fora – two 
types of arbitration, the ICJ or a court created by the LOSC, the ITLOS. Although the 
LOSC compulsory dispute settlement system is of a fairly standard kind, its inclusion 
in the LOSC was nevertheless a major political achievement. It is one thing to agree 
on the inclusion of a system of compulsory dispute settlement in a treaty with a fairly 
limited subject matter (as has been on dozens of occasions, both before and especially 
since the adoption of the LOSC), it is quite another to obtain consensus on the 
inclusion of such a system in a treaty as extensive and wide-ranging as the LOSC, 
especially at a time when a significant number of States engaged in its negotiation, 
Communist and more radical developing States, were ideologically opposed to the use 
of international courts to settle disputes. Achieving such a consensus did, however, 
come at a price. Various categories of dispute are excluded from compulsory dispute 
settlement – some automatically under Article 297 (disputes concerning the exercise 
of coastal States’ rights relating to fisheries and marine scientific research in the 
EEZ), others only where States have opted to exclude them by making a declaration 
under Article 298, which in practice only a small minority of States parties has so far 
done. Achieving consensus also required giving States a choice of fora for settling 
disputes, as well as allowing States the possibility of agreeing on a means of settling a 
dispute outside the framework of section 2 of Part XV of the LOSC. This means that 
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there is a risk that that the LOSC will be interpreted differently by different courts and 
tribunals. So far, however, there have been only rather limited divergences in 
interpretation.  
 Since the entry into force of the LOSC in 1994, the compulsory dispute 
settlement system in Part XV has, up to now at least, functioned in much the same 
way as inter-State litigation (with the exception of the WTO’s DSU) has always done. 
Thus, there have been relatively few cases (around one a year on average); the 
occurrence and subject matter of litigation has been rather random and unpredictable; 
and only a small minority of States has engaged in litigation. Not all decisions on the 
merits of a case have (yet) been complied with by the losing State, and apart from the 
possible employment of counter-measures by the winning State, there is no obvious 
mechanism to induce a losing State to comply. Only time will tell whether this turns 
out to be a significant problem that will undermine the efficacy and legitimacy of the 
LOSC’s compulsory dispute settlement system.          
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Table 1. Number of cases and means of settlement as at 1 December 2016 
ITLOS Annex VII 
arbitration 
Total 
Cases brought 7 14 21 
Decisions on merits 3 (Saiga No 2 (St. 
Vincent v. Guinea), 
Bangladesh/ 
Myanmar, Virginia 
G (Panama v. 

















Integrity (Malta v. 
São Tomé and 
Príncipe)) 
10 
Decisions finding a 
lack of jurisdiction 
1 (Louisa (St. 
Vincent v. Spain) 
1 (Southern Bluefin 
Tuna (Australia 
and New Zealand 
v. Japan)
2 
Cases withdrawn 1 (Swordfish (Chile 
v. EU))
4 (MOX Plant 












Cases pending 2 (Ghana/Côte 
d’Ivoire, Norstar 
(Panama v. Italy)) 
2 (Enrica Lexie 
(Italy v. India), 
Ukraine v. Russia) 
4 
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 Table 2. Parties to the Cases by UN Geo-Political Groups as at 1 December 2016 
 
Group Total member-






Africa 54 2 5 7 
Asia-Pacific 54 4 6 10 
Eastern Europe 23 1 2 3 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 




29 7 6 (including 
EU) 
13 





Table 3. Subject matter of the cases as at 1 December 2016 
 
 ITL0S Annex VII Total 
Seizure and 
detention of vessels 
4 (Saiga No 2) (St. 
Vincent v. Guinea)  
Louisa (St. Vincent 
v. Spain), Virginia 
G (Panama v. 
Guinea-Bissau), 








Integrity (Malta v. 
São Tomé and 
Príncipe), Enrica 
Lexie (Italy v. 
India)  
8 (4 decisions on 















5 (4 decisions on 
the merits, 1 
pending) 
Fisheries 1 (Swordfish (Chile 
v. EU)) 
2 (Southern Bluefin 
Tuna (Australia 





3 (no decisions on 
the merits – 2 
withdrawn, 1 lack 
of jurisdiction) 
Environmental 0 3 (MOX Plant 








3 (1 decision on the 
merits, 2 
withdrawn) 
Other  0 2 (South China Sea 
(Philippines v. 
China), Ukraine v. 
Russia) 
2 (1 decision on the 
merits, 1 pending) 
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